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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Darryl “Joe” Albertson contends the district court erroneously concluded the No
Trespassing sign posted on a pole at the entrance to his property did not revoke the implied
license to enter his property. There are two relevant questions in the analysis – what the law
requires, and how the law applies to the facts of this case. The State offers little in the way of
analysis in regard to the first question, and its arguments on the second are inconsistent with the
testimony and factual findings below and contrary to the applicable precedent. As such, this
Court should reject those arguments and reverse the district court’s erroneous order denying the
motion to suppress.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Albertson’s Appellant’s Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.

1

ISSUE
Whether the district court erred by denying Mr. Albertson’s motion to suppress the evidence
found as a result of the officer’s observations while he was trespassing on Mr. Albertson’s
property.
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Albertson’s Motion To Suppress The Evidence Found
As A Result Of The Officer’s Observations While He Was Trespassing On Mr. Albertson’s
Property

A.

The Law Requires A Property Owner To Give Notice In Order To Revoke The Implied
License To Enter His Property, And A No Trespassing Sign, By Itself, Is Sufficient To
Do That
The critical question the law asks in regard to the whether the implied license is revoked

turns on notice. See Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 626 (1951), abrogated on other
grounds. The State’s responses fail to appreciate this fundamental point, and, as a result, its
responses on the legal question are meritless. For example, the State’s argument – that the Idaho
Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Christensen, 131 Idaho 143 (1998), is all about the gate,
rather than the No Trespassing sign (Resp. Br., pp.12-13) – ignores the underlying concept of
notice.
While a fence or a closed gate are, indeed, ways in which such notice may be given, the
Christensen Court was clear that they are not the only ways to give notice: “While the presence
of a fence is a factor to consider in determining whether an area is open to the public, it is not
dispositive. . . . The no trespassing sign was clearly posted on a gate across the only public
access to the property. In light of this unambiguous message, it is unclear what the presence of a
fence would add.” Christensen, 131 Idaho at 147; see also I.C. § 18-7008(2)(a)(iv) (specifically
addressing trespass on unfenced land when notice of privacy is posted). The considerations
Christensen identified apply just as directly to gates as to fences themselves – if a sign or a fence
would convey the requisite notice, the presence of a gate would add nothing to the analysis. See
id.; compare State v. Howard, 155 Idaho 666, 672 (Ct. App. 2013) (suggesting a no trespassing
sign on a fence would make the land behind private even though there was no gate on the road
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giving access to the property). Thus, under Christensen, either the sign or the gate or the fence
may be sufficient to convey notice that the property is closed to others, including officers. Id.
Moreover, the State’s focus on the presence of a gate in order to claim privacy sounds
suspiciously like requiring the modern equivalent of a portcullis in order to keep property
private, which is not what the law requires. Id. (“Idaho citizens, especially those in rural areas,
should not have to convert the areas around their homes into the modern equivalent of a
medieval fortress in order to prevent uninvited entry by the public, including police officers.”).
However, if the analysis is properly focused on whether a reasonable person would be on notice,
the analysis becomes more apparent – the presence of a sign, a fence, or a gate are all factors
which can be considered in determining whether notice was given, and just because a person
chooses to use one as opposed to the others does not mean he has failed to give the requisite
notice.
Additionally, the State misreads I.C. § 18-7008, as it focuses on the amount of barriers
rather than the question of notice. The State contends that the statute requires a person to post
multiple signs at the access point in order to keep the property private. (Resp. Br., p.12.)
However, properly read, that statute, like Christensen, is all about notice.

See I.C. § 18-

7008(2)(a)(iii)-(iv) (requiring the signs or paint “is posted in a manner that a reasonable person
would be put on notice that it is private land”). The reason it uses the plural “signs” is because it
requires that some sort of notice be given at every access point to the property, where “navigable
streams, roads, gates, and rights-of-way enter[] the private land,” and there may be several such
access points on a given piece of property. Id. However, under that statute, a single sign at each
such entry point would be sufficient to convey notice to a person as he is entering that property
that his presence is not welcome. Compare Christensen, 131 Idaho at 147 (noting that the sign
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on the gate at the only access point provided the necessary notice).

Using Christensen’s

imagery, there may, in fact, be aesthetic or economic reasons a person chooses not to bedeck his
property with myriad No Trespassing signs, but that does not mean he still has not sufficiently
given notice that the public is unwelcome on his property.
The State’s position in regard to the circuit split, should Christensen be deemed
ambiguous, also ignores the underlying concept of notice. In fact, the State does not even
believe there is a split. (Resp. Br., p.14 (asserting the split is “for the most part, illusory”).) The
State is mistaken, as the courts have clearly divided into two primary groups, each of which
applies a different rule to this sort of scenario – one holding a No Trespassing sign, by itself, is
sufficient to give notice that the implied license has been revoked, and the other holding that
there needs to be a sign and some additional barrier to protect one’s privacy. 1 See, e.g., United
States v. Carloss, 818 F.3d 988, 1003-15 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting); State v.
Christensen, 517 S.W.3d 60, 72-73 (2017). The critical point, however, is not whether there is a
split, but rather, what rule Idaho should adopt if Christensen is does not answer the question of
whether a sign alone is sufficient to give the requisite notice. As Mr. Albertson explained in his
Appellant’s Brief, the first of those two rules is the better one, as, for the reasons explained in
detail in now-Justice Gorsuch’s dissent in Carloss, it more appropriately focuses on the actual
underlying constitutional consideration of notice. (App. Br., pp.11-17.)
The State does not offer any counterargument to Mr. Albertson’s analysis on the critical
point. (See generally Resp. Br.) Rather, it takes issue with how he presented the split for this
Court’s consideration. For example, it criticizes his reference to authorities as “collecting cases”

1

When their opinions are properly understood, the courts are actually split fairly evenly between
the two camps. (App. Br., pp.12-13.)
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rather than providing an extensive, unwieldy string cite listing each case which has addressed
this issue. (Resp. Br., p.15.) The State’s criticism in this regard is not well-taken, as the Idaho
Supreme Courts has done precisely the same thing when it identified such a split of authority.
Grazer v. Jones, 154 Idaho 58, 66 (2013) (“We recognize that there is a split in authority on this
issue: some states apply their respective statutes of limitations . . . , while other states take the
opposite view. See Potomac Leasing Co., v. Dasco Tech. Corp., 10 P.3d 972, 974 (Utah 2000)
(collecting cases).”). Moreover, Mr. Albertson actually discussed several of the ways other
courts, including Idaho’s courts, have tried to address this issue to show why the rule he
advocates for is the better rule. (App. Br., pp.11-16.) The fact that he did not go on ad nauseam
to address every decision ever issued in this area of the law does not undermine his analysis on
that point.
The State also contends that not every case in the collected lists will directly support
Mr. Albertson’s argument. (Resp. Br., p.15.) First, that point actually belies the State’s asserted
belief that this is an illusory split – that different courts are using different analyses to reach
different results is the definition of a split of authority. Regardless, the fact that different courts
used different analyses even within one side of the overarching split does not disprove the merits
of the argument Mr. Albertson has actually made – that this Court should, if Christensen is
ambiguous, adopt the rule articulated in now-Justice Gorsuch’s dissent in Carloss because it is
the best of the rules involved in the split.
The fact that the State has resorted to these sort of stylistic critiques, rather than actually
engaging on the merits of the argument, speaks volumes. By failing to offer any argument on the
actual merits of the issue, it has effectively conceded the critical part of this issue. See State v.
Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263 (1996) (“A party waives an issue cited on appeal if either authority
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or argument is lacking . . .”). Therefore, applying the proper understanding of the relevant law –
that a No Trespassing sign alone may be sufficient to provide the notice required to revoke the
implied license – the next question for this Court to consider is how that law applies to the facts
of Mr. Albertson’s case.

B.

The Officer Testified That The Sign Could Be Seen As A Person Drove Past The
Entrance To Mr. Albertson’s Property, And, Old And Faded Though It May Be, It Is Still
Sufficiently Legible To Give Notice And Revoke The Implied License
Whether the sign in this case was posted sufficiently to give notice that the implied

license has been revoked turns on how a “reasonably respectful citizen” would see that sign.
Christensen, 131 Idaho at 147. To that point, the officer expressly testified that, “a week later
I did see it [the sign] when I drove down the side of the road.” (Tr., p.53, Ls.15-17.) He
explained the sign would be particularly apparent to a person headed southbound. (Tr., p.24,
Ls.1-7; see Defense Exhibit A.) Thus, according to the officer’s own testimony, the sign itself
was visible to a reasonably respectful citizen on the road going past Mr. Albertson’s property.
The State takes exception Mr. Albertson’s assertion that the sign was visible because that
assertion was based on the district court’s “assumption” that the sign was actually posted on the
day in question. (Resp. Br., p.10.) The State’s argument – that such an assumption is not due
deference by this Court – is frivolous because, as the Idaho Supreme Court has long since
explained, “[t]hough the evidence is equivocal and somewhat in dispute, that finding of fact is
one reasonable inference which may be drawn from the record, and thus it will not be disturbed
by this Court on appeal.” State v. Post, 98 Idaho 834, 837 (1978), overruled on other grounds
(emphasis added); accord State v. Lutton, 161 Idaho 556, 562 (Ct. App. 2017). In other words,
when the district court infers or assumes a fact based on the evidence in the record, that is a
finding of fact which is entitled to deference. Id. Here, the district court’s assumption that the
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sign was posted on the day in question was based on Mr. Albertson’s testimony that the sign has
been posted there for some years and the officer’s testimony that it was also there a week later.
(See Tr., p.53, Ls.15-16, p.55, Ls.13-16.) Thus, it was reasonable for the district court to draw
that particular inference, to assume that the sign was, in fact, displayed as shown in the pictures
on the day in question. That factual finding is, therefore, entitled to deference.
Furthermore, the State’s argument confuses the concept that the sign itself was visible
with the concept of whether the words on the sign were legible. (See Resp. Br., p.10.) The two
concepts are not synonymous. The term “visible” means “‘capable of being seen,’ ‘perceptible
by vision,’ ‘easily seen.’” State v. Tregeagle, 161 Idaho 763, 767 (Ct. App. 2017) (quoting
WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT’L DICT. 2557 (3d ed. 1993)). The term “legible,” on the other hand,
means “‘capable of being deciphered’” and “‘distinct to the eye.’” State v. Kinch, 159 Idaho 96,
100-01 (Ct. App. 2015) (quoting, inter alia, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT’L DICT. 1291).
Thus, in Tregeagle, a license plate which was mounted behind a trailer hitch was not
“visible” because the trailer hitch prevented a person from actually seeing the license plate itself,
regardless of whether the numbers on the license plate were themselves capable of being
deciphered. See Tregeagle, 161 Idaho at 767. In Kinch, on the other hand, even though the
officer could actually see that there was a temporary permit taped in the back window of the car
(i.e., the permit was “visible”), he could not read the information on that permit, and so, the
permit was not legible as the statute required. Kinch, 159 Idaho at 97, 100-01. The Kinch Court
specifically contrasted situation with another, which required applications for specialty license
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plates needed to be “display[ed],” as opposed to be “readily legible, readable, or even
viewable.”2 Id at 100.
In this case the sign on the pole at the entrance to Mr. Albertson’s property, like the
permit in Kinch, was “visible” because the sign itself was capable of being seen by a person on
the road going past Mr. Albertson’s property. (Tr., p.24, Ls.1-7, p.53, Ls.15-17; see Defense
Exhibit A.) That description remains true whether or not the words on that sign were legible
from a distance. To that point, Mr. Albertson has never contended that the sign was not old and
faded, nor has he contended that the sign can be read from a distance. (See, e.g., App. Br., pp.1,
9 (directing this Court to the exhibits showing the condition of the sign).) He only argued that
the placement of the sign itself, at the main entrance to the property, was more prominent than
the placement of the sign in Howard, which the Court specifically noted was not at the point
where the road entered the property, but rather, was off to one side. (App. Br., p.9 (referencing
Howard, 155 Idaho at 672).)
This distinction is important because a reasonably respectful citizen would see the sign
itself as they started to enter Mr. Albertson’s property.3 (See Defense Exhibit A.) A reasonably
respectful citizen would also be aware that property owners will put up signs to indicate a desire

2

The Kinch Court indicated that the language “readily legible” in the statute at issue in that case
(I.C. § 49-432(4)) seemed to require that the information on the temporary permit had to be
legible (meaning both visible and readable) from a distance, but it ultimately did not answer the
distance question. Kinch, 159 Idaho at 100-01. The Idaho Supreme Court has just recently
granted review after the Court of Appeals affirmed that Kinch’s indication was accurate. See
State v. Cook, 2018 WL 3653064 (Ct. App. 2018), rev. granted. Ultimately, though, the
continuing validity of Kinch in that respect is of no issue to this case because there is no
corresponding requirement that the notice be readily legible from a particular distance; the
question here is simply whether it was sufficient to give notice to a reasonably-respectful citizen.
See Christensen, 131 Idaho at 147; I.C. § 18-7008(2)(a)(iii)-(iv).
3
It also appears that there is a plastic sleeve attached to the front of the pole protecting a wire
which comes down that side of the pole, and that plastic sleeve may prevent a more forwardfacing placement of the sign. (See Defense Exhibits A and B.)
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to restrict unwanted visitors and announce their expectations of privacy. E.g., State v. Hiebert,
156 Idaho 637, 642 (Ct. App. 2014) (recognizing that “[p]osting ‘no trespassing’ signs may
indicate a desire to restrict unwanted visitors and announce one expectations of privacy.”). As
such, a reasonably respectful citizen, especially one in rural Paul, Idaho,4 would check to see if
this was one such sign before entering the property, rather than, as the State seems to suggest,
disregard its presence entirely. And since this particular sign is old and faded, and so, is not
legible from a distance, a reasonably respectful citizen who sees the sign would get closer to it in
order to be able to read it. Therefore, the State’s point about the sign not being legible from
across the road actually has little relevance to the proper analysis in this case.
On the other hand, the State’s concession that the sign was, in fact, legible at a closer
distance is, of paramount relevance. (See Resp. Br., p.8 (admitting that “only some of the words
are legible”); see Defense Exhibit B (depicting the words on the sign from closer distance).)
Given the fact that the sign can be read as a person approaches it, a reasonably respectful citizen
would, in fact, be put on notice that this was “Private Property” and that there was to be
“No Trespass” thereon. (See Defense Exhibit B.) As a result, while this notice certainly could
have been posted more clearly or more conspicuously, it was still posted sufficiently to give a
reasonably respectful citizen the requisite notice that the implied license to enter this property
had been revoked. After all, the Fourth Amendment is not premised on what is best; it is
premised on what is reasonable. See Christensen, 131 Idaho at 147 (noting that a person could

4

As always, the analysis of whether consent has been revoked is based on the totality of the
circumstances. State v. Wulff, 157 Idaho 416, 423 (2014). The fact that this occurred in a rural
area is a relevant factor to consider. See Christensen, 131 Idaho at 147 (“In short, Idaho citizens,
especially those in rural areas, should not have to convert the areas around their homes into the
modern equivalent of a modern fortress in order to prevent uninvited entry by the public,
including police officers”) (emphasis added).
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erect extensive fencing to better keep people off their land, but such is beyond what is sufficient
to maintain one’s privacy).
Since the totality of the circumstances shows that a reasonably respectful citizen would
see the sign and the sign gave sufficient notice, the officer, who admitted he did not have
permission to enter from Mr. Albertson when he entered onto Mr. Albertson’s property, was not
lawfully on the property. As a result, any evidence which he discovered as a result of that
unlawful entry should have been suppressed.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Albertson respectfully requests this Court reverse the order denying his motion to
suppress and remand this case for further proceedings, if any are necessary.
DATED this 23rd day of October, 2018.

/s/ Brian R. Dickson
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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